Abstract. Algebraic attack has recently become an important tool in cryptanalysing different stream and block cipher systems. A Boolean function, when used in some cryptosystem, should be designed properly to resist this kind of attack. The cryptographic property of a Boolean function, that resists algebraic attack, is known as Algebraic Immunity (AI). So far, the attempt in designing Boolean functions with required algebraic immunity was only ad-hoc, i.e., the functions were designed keeping in mind the other cryptographic criteria, and then it has been checked whether it can provide good algebraic immunity too. For the first time, in this paper, we present a construction method to generate Boolean functions on n variables with highest possible algebraic immunity n 2
Introduction
Recent literature shows that algebraic attack has gained a lot of attention in cryptanalysing stream and block cipher systems. The attack uses overdefined systems of multivariate equations to recover the secret key [1, 2, 10-14, 18, 17] . Given a Boolean function f on n-variables, different kinds of scenarios related to low degree multiples of f have been studied in [13, 18] . The core of the analysis is to find out minimum (or low) degree annihilators of f and 1 + f , i.e., to find out minimum (or low) degree functions g 1 , g 2 such that f * g 1 = 0 and (1 + f ) * g 2 = 0. To mount the algebraic attack, one needs only the low degree linearly independent annihilators [13, 18] of f, 1 + f .
So far very little attempt has been made to provide construction of Boolean functions that can resist algebraic attacks. In [15] , some existing construction methods have been analysed that can provide Boolean functions with some other cryptographic properties to see how good they are in terms of algebraic immunity.
Algebraic immunity of certain constructions have also been studied in [3] [4] [5] . In [5] , the authors have proved that the algebraic immunity of the n-variable functions constructed by Tarannikov's method [21, 19] attain Ω( √ n) algebraic immunity. This presents a sharper result than what presented in [15] in terms of analysing Tarannikov's construction [21, 19] . Construction of cryptographically significant Boolean functions with improved algebraic immunity has also been presented in [7] .
However, so far there is no existing construction method that can achieve maximum possible algebraic immunity. In this paper, for the first time, we provide a construction method where the algebraic immunity is the main concern. We show that given a Boolean function on n − 2d variables having algebraic immunity 1, we can always construct a Boolean function on n variables with algebraic immunity at least d + 1. The construction is iterative in nature (a function with two more variables is constructed in each step) and we need to apply it d times to get an n-variable function from an (n − 2d)-variable initial function. We also show that the construction preserves the order of resiliency and increases the nonlinearity by more than 2 2d times in d-steps (as it can be seen as a direct sum of a function with good nonlinearity and resiliency with another function with good algebraic immunity). Also using our construction one can generate n-variable functions with highest possible algebraic immunity n 2 and good nonlinearity. For this one needs to start with 1 or 2-variable nonconstant functions.
Further, in a different direction, we show that if a Boolean function has low degree subfunctions then it is not good in terms of algebraic immunity. This result generalizes the analysis on Maiorana-McFarland type functions presented in [18] . Further our analysis answers some of the questions presented in [15] regarding the algebraic immunity of the functions presented in [20] .
Preliminaries
A Boolean function on n variables may be viewed as a mapping from {0, 1} n into {0, 1} and define B n as the set of all n-variable Boolean functions. One of the standard representation of a Boolean function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is by the output column of its truth table, i.e., a binary string of length 2 n ,
The set of x ∈ {0, 1} n for which f (x) = 1 (respectively f (x) = 0) is called the onset (respectively offset), denoted by 1 f (respectively 0 f ). We say that a Boolean function f is balanced if the truth table contains an equal number of 1's and 0's.
The Hamming weight of a binary string S is the number of ones in the string. This number is denoted by wt(S). The Hamming distance between two strings, S 1 and S 2 is denoted by d(S 1 , S 2 ) and is the number of places where S 1 and S 2 differ. Note that d(S 1 , S 2 ) = wt(S 1 + S 2 ) (by abuse of notation, we also use + to denote the GF (2) addition, i.e., the XOR). By S 1 ||S 2 we mean the concatenation of two strings. By S we mean the complement of the string S.
Any Boolean function has a unique representation as a multivariate polynomial over GF (2), called the algebraic normal form (ANF),
where the coefficients a 0 , a i,j , . . . , a 1,2,...,n ∈ {0, 1}. The algebraic degree, deg(f ), is the number of variables in the highest order term with non zero coefficient. A Boolean function is affine if there exists no term of degree > 1 in the ANF and the set of all affine functions is denoted A n . An affine function with constant term equal to zero is called a linear function.
It is known that a Boolean function should be of high algebraic degree to be cryptographically secure [16] . Further, it has been identified recently, that it should not have a low degree multiple [13] . The algebraic attack (see [13, 18] and the references in these papers) is getting a lot of attention recently. To resist algebraic attacks, the Boolean functions used in the cryptosystems should be chosen properly. It is shown [13] that given any n-variable Boolean function f , it is always possible to get a Boolean function g with degree at most n 2 such that f * g is of degree at most n 2 . Here the functions are considered to be multivariate polynomials over GF (2) and f * g is the polynomial multiplication over GF (2) . Thus while choosing an f , the cryptosystem designer should be careful that it should not happen that degree of f * g falls much below n 2 . Towards defining algebraic immunity [13, 18, 15] , one needs to consider the multiples of both f and 1 + f .
1. Take f, g, h ∈ B n . Assume that there exists a nonzero function g of low degree such that f * g = h or (1 + f ) * g = h, where h is a nonzero function of low degree and without loss of generality, deg(g) ≤ deg(h). Among all such h's we denote the lowest degree h (may be more than one and then we take any one of them) by ldgm n (f ). 2. Assume there exists a nonzero function g of low degree such that f * g = 0 or (1 + f ) * g = 0. Among all such g's we denote the lowest degree g (may be more than one and then we take any one of them) by ldga n (f ).
It can be checked that [18, 15] for f ∈ B n , deg(ldgm n (f )) = deg(ldga n (f )) and in this line the following definition of algebraic immunity has been presented in [15] .
Later we also need the following definition related to the annihilator set of a function.
The nonlinearity of an n-variable function f is the minimum distance from the set of all n-variable affine functions, i.e.,
Boolean functions used in crypto systems must have high nonlinearity to prevent linear attacks [16] .
Many properties of Boolean functions can be described by the Walsh transform. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) both belonging to {0, 1}
n and
Correlation immune functions and resilient functions are two important classes of Boolean functions. A function is m-resilient (respectively mth order correlation immune) iff its Walsh transform satisfies
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the construction and the following section discusses the analysis of algebraic immunity of a function in terms of the degree of its subfunctions.
Construction to get AI as required
In this section we present a construction to get Boolean function of n+2 variables with algebraic immunity d + 2 ≤ n+2 2
. The construction is iterative in nature and it starts from an initial function of n + 2 − 2(d + 1) = n − 2d variables having algebraic immunity 1 (the minimum possible value). In each step, 2 variables are added and algebraic immunity gets increased by 1. Let us now formalize the construction.
Construction 1 Let f ∈ B n such that f = E||F ||G||H where E, F, G, H ∈ B n−2 . Let n − 2d > 0 and d ≥ 0. Take an initial function f n−2d ∈ B n−2d with AI n−2d (f n−2d ) = 1. Suppose after d-th step f n ∈ B n has been constructed. The next function f n+2 ∈ B n+2 is constructed in following manner:
for any function f j , f 0 j = f j , and for the initial function f n−2d ,
To understand the recursion in the Construction 1, we present an example up to some depths.
This goes on unless we reach at the level of the (n − 2d)-variable initial function.
n−6 . Also, for notational consistency, we take (
l length binary string which is the truth table of the function) on l variables. Below we present the construction idea as truth table concatenation.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Thus after the k-th step, the function f l+2k is the concatenation of 2 2k numbers of f l and f l = 1 + f l . That is, the subfunctions of f l+2k at 2k-depth are only f l and f l . That is, f l+2k can be seen as direct sum of f l and a 2k-variable function.
To prove the main theorem we first present the following results. In the proofs we will use the fact that for any f ∈ B n and any subset V ∈ {0, 1} n , the restriction of any annihilator g of f to V is an annihilator of the restriction of f to V . For technical reasons (see also Remark 1 after the proof of Lemma 2), during our proofs we will encounter certain situations when degree of a function is < 0. As such functions cannot exist, we will replace those functions by 0 (function).
Lemma 1.
Consider that the function f n+2 ∈ B n+2 has been generated by Construction 1 after (d + 1) many steps, d ≥ 1, taking f n−2d as the initial function. Take g, h ∈ B n−2 . We assume that if
Proof. We prove it by induction. For the base step d = 1. Here deg(g + h) ≤ 1 − 2 − i ≤ −2 implies such a function cannot exist (see also Remark 1), i.e., g + h is identically 0, which gives g = h.
Now g ∈ AN (f 1,i n−2d ) and h ∈ AN (f 1,i+1
n−2d ). Since f n−2d is the initial function, by Construction 1, f 1,i+1
n−2d ) and
n−2d ). Thus g, h, being nonzero, cannot be same. So g = h = 0. This proves the base step. Now we prove the inductive step. Consider that the function f n ∈ B n has been generated by Construction Take,
we deduce the following.
Following the assumption in the statement of the lemma, we get v 1 = v 5 = 0.
Hence we get g = h = 0 for i ≥ 1.
Lemma 2.
Consider that f n+2 ∈ B n+2 has been generated using the Construction 1 after (d + 1)-th step with initial function f n−2d . Let AI(f n−2d+2i
Proof. We will use induction on d. For the base step (i.e., d = 0) we have f 1 n = f n as f n the initial function when d = 0. Here g n and h n are annihilators of f n and f 1 n = f n respectively. Since deg(g n+2 ) ≤ 1, and g n+2 = g n + x n+2 x n+1 (g n + h n ), g n + h n = 0, which gives g n = h n . Since g n ∈ AN (f n ) and h n ∈ AN (f n ), being non zero functions, they cannot be same, i.e., g n = h n = 0. Then g n+2 = 0. Now we prove the inductive step. Assume the induction assumption holds till d steps, d ≥ 0. Now we will prove the lemma statement at (d + 1)-th step. That is f n+2 ∈ B n+2 has been generated by Construction 1 after (d + 1)-th step with AI(f n+2 ) ≤ d + 1 and AI(f n−2d+2i ) = i + 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ d. Here g n+2 = g n + x n+2 x n+1 (g n + h n ) ∈ AN (f n+2 ) of degree ≤ d + 1, where g n ∈ AN (f n ) and h n ∈ AN (f 1 n ). Suppose deg(g n + h n ) ≤ d − 1. Then here, we will prove that g n = h n = 0. Here
Thus, using the induction hypothesis we have B = C = F = G = 0. So,
We have assumed the inductive steps upto d-th step. That gives that if g n−2d+2i ∈ AN (f n−2d+2i ), h n−2d+2i ∈ AN (f Proof. We have to prove that any nonzero function g n+2 such that g n+2 f n+2 = 0 has degree at least d + 2. Suppose that such a function g n+2 with degree at most d + 1 exists. Then, g n+2 can be decomposed as
where g n , g n , g n ∈ AN (f n ), and h n ∈ AN (f 1 n ). The algebraic normal form of g n+2 is then
If g n+2 has degree at most d + 1, then (g n + g n ) and (g n + g n ) have degree at most d. Because both functions lie in AN (f n ) and AI(f n ) = d + 1, we deduce that g n + g n = 0 and g n + g n = 0, which give, g n = g n = g n . Therefore,
Now following the Lemma 2 we have g n = h n = 0, that gives, g n+2 = 0. Similarly one can check that there cannot be any nonzero annihilator of 1 + f n+2 having degree ≤ d + 1. This completes the proof.
Using this Construction 1, one can generate a function on n variables whose algebraic immunity is the highest possible, i.e., n 2 . In this case one has to start from 1 or 2-variable nonconstant function. Then after each step we will get a function on two more variables and the algebraic immunity will increase by 1.
Example 1. First we present the case for odd n. One can start from f 1 = x 1 .
Step 1: f 1 = 01
Step 5: f 9 = f 7 f 7 f 7 f 5 0101011001101001011010011001011001010110 01101001011010011001011001101001100101101001011001101001 Then we present the case for even n. One can start from nonlinear function f 2 = x 1 x 2 as the initial function.
Step 1: f 2 = 0001
Step 5:
Note that the algebraic immunity stays the same if a function is subjected to linear transformation on input variables. Thus, taking any function presented in the above example, one can apply linear transformation to get number of functions. Further the nonlinearity and algebraic degree also stays same after linear transformation. Now we will discuss some other cryptographic properties of the functions generated using Construction 1 after k-th step. Corollary 1. Let f d+2k ∈ B d+2k is constructed by Construction 1 taking f d ∈ B d as the initial function, i.e., f d+2k = f d + φ 2k , the direct sum. In Item 1 of Corollary 1 we are using nl(φ 2k ). We have observed that nl(φ 2k ) is equal to the number of 1's in its truth table. We have checked that the values of nl(φ 2k ) are 1, 5, 22, 93, 386, 1586, 6476, 26333 for k = 1, . . . , 8. Using this, here we present the nonlinearity of the functions given in Example 1. The initial function is the f 1 = x 1 which is a linear function. So, nl(f 1 ) = 0. Therefore, nl(f 3 ) = 2, nl(f 5 ) = 10, nl(f 7 ) = 44, nl(f 9 ) = 186, nl(f 11 ) = 772, nl(f 13 ) = 3172, nl(f 15 ) = 12952, nl(f 17 ) = 52666. Similarly if one starts with a 5-variable 1-resilient function with nonlinearity 12, one gets a 7-variable 1-resilient function with nonlinearity 56 (as nl(φ 2 ) = 1), then a 9-variable 1-resilient function with nonlinearity 232 (as nl(φ 4 ) = 5) and so on. We like to point out once again that the nonlinearity remains very good in this construction and the order of resiliency is also not disturbed as it is a direct sum construction of a function f d with good properties in terms of nonlinearity and resiliency and a function φ 2k which is good in terms of algebraic immunity. When the weight (also nonlinearity) of the function φ 2k is odd, then clearly its algebraic degree is 2k. We have also checked upto k = 6, that when the weight (also nonlinearity) is even then the algebraic degree is 2k − 1. The exact nonlinearity and algebraic degree of φ 2k is still open at this stage and we are working on it. Certain ideas in this area have also been provided by Carlet [9] .
Note that if one starts with an initial function f n−2d ∈ B n−2d having algebraic immunity D, it is not guaranteed that after d steps f n will have algebraic immunity d + D; the only guarantee is that it will be ≥ d + 1 (following similar arguement as in the proof of Theorem 1). It will be interesting to see what is the exact algebraic immunity of f n .
Functions with low degree subfunctions
In this section we discuss why a Boolean function with low degree subfunction is not good in terms of algebraic immunity. This result is a generalization of the result presented in [18] , where the authors have shown that certain kind of Maiorana-McFarland constructions are not good in terms of algebraic immunity. Proposition 1. Let f ∈ B n . Let g ∈ B n−r be a subfunction of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) after fixing r many distinct inputs x i1 , . . . , x ir ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n }. If the algebraic degree of g is d, then AI n (f ) ≤ d + r.
Proof. Let x i1 , . . . , x ir are fixed at the values a i1 , . . . , a ir ∈ {0, 1}. Thus g is a function on the variables {x 1 , . . . , x n } \ {x i1 , . . . , x ir }. It can be checked that
The Maiorana-McFarland construction can be seen as concatenation of affine functions on n−r variables to construct an n-variable functions. Clearly we have affine subfunctions of the constructed function in this case and hence deg(g) = 1 following the notation of Proposition 1. Thus there will be annihilators of degree 1 + r. Note that if r is small, then one can get annihilators at low degree [18, Theorem 2, Example 1]. This situation for Maiorana-McFarland construction is only a subcase of our proposition. Our result works on any function, it need not be of Maiorana-McFarland type only. We present an example below.
Example 2. Let us consider a 20-variable function, with a subfunction of degree 2 on 17-variables, i.e., we fix 3 inputs. In that case the 20-variable function will have an annihilator at degree 2 + 3 = 5.
Maiorana-McFarland type of constructions are used in design of resilient functions. One idea in this direction is to concatenate k-variable affine functions (repetition may be allowed) non degenerate on at least m+1 variables to generate an m-resilient function f on n-variables. For such a function f , it is easy to find an annihilator g of degree n − k + 1 as described in [18] . However, it should be noted that in construction of resilient functions, there are lot of techniques [20] that use concatenation of k-variable affine functions where k < n 2 . In such a case, the annihilators described in [18, Theorem 2] will be of degree greater than n 2 and will not be of practical use as there are other annihilators of degree ≤ n 2 which are not of the form given in [18, Theorem 2] . We will show that even in such a case, Proposition 1 can provide further insight. We will show that a well known construction of resilient function [20, Theorem 10(b)] on n-variables (n odd) can never achieve the algebraic immunity n 2 . At the best, it can only achieve the value n 2 . To explain this construction we briefly present some notations from [20] .
Take a bit b and a bit string s = s 0 . . . s n−1 . Then the string b AND s = s 0 . . . s n−1 , where s i = b AND s i . Take two bit strings x = x 0 . . . x n−1 and y = y 0 . . . y m−1 . The Kronecker product x ⊗ y = (x 0 AND y) . . . (x n−1 AND y), which is a string of length nm. The direct sum of two bit strings x, y is x$y = (x⊗y c )⊕(x c ⊗y), where x c , y c are bitwise complement of x, y respectively. As an example presented in [20] , if f = 01, and g = 0110, then f $g = 01101001. Now we present the construction for (2p + 1, 1, 2p − 1, 2 2p − 2 p ) function as presented in [20] for p ≥ 4.
